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 The Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan has generated a large amount 
of controversy over its mandatory carbon dioxide emissions cuts at the state level. 27 states have 
currently signed on to the federal lawsuit over the Clean Power plan that is currently pending, 
while only 18 have signed to support the EPA’s position. In this paper, reasons why carbon 
agreements at the federal and international levels often fail are outlined. Attempted solutions by 
state and local governments are also discussed. Program operations and specific details of the 
plan are then outlined. This paper also seeks to identify reasons why states oppose the Clean 
Power Plan. A logistic regression with state opposition to the Clean Power Plan as the 
categorical respondent variable will be run. Variables that are hypothesized to be significant for 
the relationship include whether or not the state has a Republican Governor, the amount of coal 
produced in each state measured in short tons, and the percentage of each state’s energy 
production that comes from renewable energy. After the regression was run, Republican 
Governor and renewable percentage production were confirmed to be extremely significant 
variables in explaining opposition to the Clean Power Plan. Renewable percentage made it less 
likely for a state to oppose the Clean Power Plan, while having a Republican Governor greatly 
increased the odds of a state opposing the Clean Power Plan. Coal production was not found to 
be statistically significant. This research leaves other questions for future research, such as 







 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established under 
executive order by President Richard Nixon in 1970, and ever since has been the primary federal 
agency that handles the crafting of environmental regulations designed to protect the 
environment and public health. Unsurprisingly, the regulations implemented by the agency are 
often subject to vehement opposition. Attempts to limit pollution, whether it be particulate 
matter, greenhouse gases, runoff in lakes and streams, or any other number of pollutants often 
find opposition in groups with vested interests in practices that cause the current level of 
pollution like business and corporate interests. EPA is no stranger to facing legal challenges over 
the rules that they issue. According to a report by the Government Accountability Office, the 
Environmental Protection Agency was sued and subsequently named as a defendant in a federal 
court case over one of their regulations approximately 155 times per year over the time period 
1995-2010 (GAO 2011). 
 One recent regulation issued by the EPA has caused a level of controversy unseen even 
by the EPA, however. First proposed in 2014 and finalized in the late summer of 2015, EPA’s 
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, colloquially known as the Clean Power Plan, seeks to curb emissions of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) from existing power plants in the United States. EPA calculated emissions 
reductions goals for each state that they must ultimately meet by the year 2030. While more 
specific details of the plan will be laid out in later sections, it is important to note that there were 
not any specified mechanisms that EPA required the states to follow. In the end, how each state 
met their emissions reduction requirements are left to each individual state to determine what 
will work best for their state. Despite this, EPA has received a large amount of opposition to the 
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rule, larger than most standard legal battles the EPA usually must fight. As of the writing of this 
paper, 27 states had signed on to the official condensed federal appeals court case challenging 
the EPA’s legal authority to issue such a rule, officially titled State of West Virginia, et al. v. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al. (2016). More than half of the states suing 
the EPA in federal court over a single regulation is not something that happens often. 
 A large reason why the EPA felt the need to act on carbon dioxide emissions, despite the 
controversy, is the fact that other levels of government, in both the United States and worldwide, 
have not found much success, if any at all, when it comes to curbing the levels of greenhouse 
gases. Most in the academic and scientific community agree that it will take a concerted effort by 
a large international coalition of nations in order to seriously mitigate or reverse the trends of 
increasing carbon dioxide emissions and rising global atmospheric temperatures. However, 
international efforts to combat emissions inevitably run afoul for a variety of reasons to be 
discussed in later sections. Absent an international coalition, the duty to combat carbon 
emissions then falls to each individual nation on its own to combat. However, increasing 
gridlock and partisanship within the United States Congress has led to little or no serious action 
over the past decade when it comes to greenhouse gas regulations. So, responsibility for 
emissions must be taken up elsewhere. State and local governments have actually been more 
proactive than one might initially think in attempting to combat their local emissions. Reasons 
for this and attempted solutions will be discussed in later sections. Additionally, the EPA is a 
federal agency that is not subject to the same partisan gridlock that currently plagues Congress. 
While their regulations are surely to be met by political challenges, they do not have to fight 
tooth and nail to get them drafted and passed at all like those who fight for emissions reductions 
in Congress. Therefore, the EPA took action because it was necessary to do so. Outside of some 
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concentrated state and local efforts to combat greenhouse gas emissions, international and other 
federal attempts to solve the problem have not been successful. EPA is not in the clear yet, 
however, as the Clean Power Plan has been stayed by the U.S. Supreme Court until litigation 
over it has been settled. 
 This paper will seek to address the reasons why EPA has been met with such fierce 
opposition to the Clean Power Plan. The literature review will highlight why federal and 
international attempts at carbon abatement have failed, and will seek to highlight some of the 
state and local efforts at solving local pollution problems, such as cap-and-trade programs and 
natural gas vehicles. These solutions are important because they could potentially explain why 
some states oppose the Clean Power Plan and why others do not: if a state has found success 
with a cap-and-trade system, they might be more likely to support the plan, and vice-verse. After 
exploring these solutions, a more detailed look into the workings and the program operation of 
the Clean Power Plan is offered in an attempt to better understand exactly what it is and what it 
would require of the states. 
 The research question, variables of interests, and statistical methods that can help to 
answer the research question are laid out next. The research question frames the analysis in a 
way that factors that affect state-level opposition to the Clean Power Plan can be analyzed. 
Variables of interest to examine will be fleshed in out detail later, but will include some variables 
derived from the discussion in the literature, including presence of cap-and-trade policies, natural 
gas and coal production by state, etc. The methods employed to answer the research question 
take the form of a logistic regression, in which the relationship between binary dependent 
variable (opposition or lack thereof to the Clean Power Plan) and a number of candidate 
independent variables can be assessed. The paper concludes with a presentation of the results 
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from the regression models fitted in the analysis, and conclusions and future implications for 
research that can be drawn from those results. 
 Ultimately, whether the Clean Power Plan survives its legal challenges or not, it will take 
measures like it at an international scale in order to truly reverse the ever-upwardly rising carbon 
dioxide emissions trends currently being observed. By examining the variables that explain the 
opposition to the plan in the United States, future attempts at carbon abatement can keep these 
relationships and objections in mind and attempt to incorporate them both when fashioning 






Carbon Agreements at the Federal and International Level 
As the true scope of the global impacts of carbon pollution has become apparent over the last 
few decades, there have been several attempts to find solutions to the problem on an international 
level (such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997). However, time after time these international 
environmental agreements (IEA’s) fail to produce any measure of tangible change that will lead 
to a worldwide reduction of CO2 emissions. There exists an abundance of literature on the 
underlying theory that explains the consistent failure of these agreements to reach a lasting 
solution to the problem, and why it is unlikely that an international solution will be possible 
without significant systemic alterations to the way that these agreements are forged. 
A fundamental reason why international environmental agreements often fail is due to the 
fact that there are often extremely weak or no enforcement provisions whatsoever. 
Environmental problems like CO2 pollution are by nature global problems; all countries 
contribute to carbon pollution in the atmosphere, therefore theoretically it should take a 
cooperative effort to solve the problem. However, the fact remains that individual states maintain 
autonomy over environmental affairs that take place within their own borders, and there is not an 
effective enforcement mechanism currently in place to force states to hold up their end of the 
bargain on climate agreements. Hoel (1991) summarizes the problem: since “each country’s own 
contributions to worldwide emissions is small, there is little a country can do by itself…in the 
absence of suitable institutions which can make and enforce global decisions” (Hoel 56).While 
the United Nations has made unprecedented strides in uniting the world’s states together under 
the guise of collective decision-making, and is responsible for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the coalition in charge of most of the recent international work 
8 
 
on carbon reduction, the fact remains that even the United Nations does not have the ability to 
police autonomous nations like China and India to ensure that they are keeping their end of the 
bargain under the terms negotiated in climate agreements. Without these key enforcement 
capabilities, a number of undesirable consequences naturally follow. 
One consequence of the lack of enforcement documented extensively in the literature is the 
free-rider problem. Various studies such as Barrett (1999) and Rubio and Ulph (2007) have 
demonstrated that due to the lack of enforcement, countries will absolutely not comply with 
environmental agreements unless the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. Hoel (1994) points out 
that while it is often in a country’s best interest in the short-run economically to not participate, a 
country “will usually be even better off if other countries cooperate, while it itself stays outside 
the agreement and pursues its own self-interest” (Hoel 259). This is often the case with 
international environmental agreements, especially from the point of view of developing 
economies whose driving force is manufacturing, one of the most pollutant-heavy industries. 
There is a prevailing sense of unfairness amongst these developing countries – they feel that 
since now-developed nations like the United States had little to no restrictions on their pollution 
activities when they were in the developing stages, it is not fair that they themselves are now 
being asked to submit to heavy regulation. 
Downie (2014) identifies two reasons why international environmental agreements are 
notoriously unsuccessful, reasons that he deems “procedural obstacles” inherent in the process of 
negotiating environmental agreements. First of these is the lowest-common denominator 
problem. The problem stems from the previously discussed lack of enforcement mechanisms. 
Since carbon pollution is a worldwide problem, international attempts to address it require 
cooperation across a broad range of states. However, there are many states who have little 
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interest in cooperating with an international agreement. For the agreement to succeed, these 
uninterested states must be persuaded to sign on to the agreements. Knowing that they have this 
leverage, “international and global environmental policy often represents, at least at the start, the 
lowest-common-denominator measures that the relevant countries are willing to accept” (Downie 
2014, pg. 94). In essence, international environmental agreements can be held hostage by those 
states least willing to take part. The standards can only be set as high as these uninterested 
nations will allow them to be set; if they are made too strict they will exercise their right to not 
participate, scuttling the entire agreement. The other procedural obstacle that Downie discusses 
is the time-lag issue. Environmental issues are unique in that they often take years to manifest or 
reveal themselves as serious problems, and in addition the “significant time lag between the 
identification of an international environmental problem and the impact of international policy” 
(Downie 2014, pg. 95). In the case of carbon pollution, the failure of the world to make 
significant progress in an emissions reduction framework in the years following Kyoto does not 
mean that the problem is at a standstill. While gridlock prevents a treaty from taking shape, 
greenhouse gas emissions continue to pour into the atmosphere, worsening the problem. This is 
significant because “by the time a policy is put into place, the situation has often grown far 
worse” (Downie 2014, pg. 95). A solution to pollution that took a decade to forge is likely to be 
archaic and outdated by the time it is actually adopted and implemented, as the constant pollution 
over the course of the negotiating period has worsened the situation. 
While most of the literature recognizes that it will take a coordinated, international effort to 
combat global carbon emissions in a serious way, this does not preclude individual nations from 
forging solutions to their own individual greenhouse gas emissions. On the domestic front, the 
United States, at least at the federal level, has not seen much more success than has been realized 
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on the international stage. A severe economic downturn and the Obama administration’s decision 
to prioritize health reform in its first term put many environmental issues on the backburner. 
Most notably, the Waxman-Markey bill that would have established a national cap and trade 
program (a solution that will be discussed in depth in the next section) was passed by the House 
of Representatives but failed to clear the Senate in 2010. Subsequent attempts at solving the 
problem have fallen victim to partisanship, with many killed by tying them to votes on the 
approval of the highly-contested Keystone XL Pipeline. The most significant legislation to pass 
in recent years, a bill authored by Sens. Portman (R-Ohio) and Shaheen (D-New Hampshire) that 
made improvements to federal energy efficiency regulations in buildings was only be able to be 
passed through parliamentary trickery, with the two senators forcing a voice vote deep into the 
night when they were the only two senators remaining on the floor of the Senate (The Hill, 
2015).  
While legislative inaction on the issue of carbon pollution has been well documented, the 
Obama administration’s Environmental Protection Agency has taken a more active role in 
combatting CO2 emissions from domestic sources. Over the past two years, a series of measures, 
the most significant of which has been termed the Clean Power Plan, have sought to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States by regulating power-generating electric utilities. 
Specifically, the Clean Power Plan sets target emissions levels of carbon dioxide from power 
utility plants for each state that must be met ultimately by 2030, with a series of intermediate 
progress checks along the way. The ultimate goal of the Clean Power Plan is a 32 percent total 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from power plants at their 2005 levels (EPA 2015). More 
specific details regarding the Clean Power Plan and its program operations will be discussed 
more heavily in the sections to come as well, however at the present moment it has been stayed 
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by the Supreme Court until litigation surrounding its constitutionality has time to work its way 
through the federal courts system of the United States (Washington Post, 2015). 
After many failures to reach an agreement at the international level regarding climate issues, 
including the widely disappointing Copenhagen talks in 2009, media accounts of the recent 
meeting of the UN Framework on Climate Change in Paris have told a story of success. While 
this news is encouraging, only time will tell if the agreement reached by the member nations 
there will have a meaningful impact on global carbon emissions. This fact, combined with the 
inability of the United States to take meaningful action at the federal level, leaves a problem that 
theoretically must be solved by an international coalition to state and local governments. While it 
is naïve to think that a global problem can be solved on a local scale, many of the steps that have 
been undertaken by local governments in recent years provide a solid framework that, if applied 






State and Local-level CO2 Abatement Solutions 
 Despite the either unwillingness or inability to take action on carbon dioxide emissions at 
the federal level in the United States, individual states have shown a willingness to take action on 
the issues of carbon abatement. Through a combination of attempted solutions like regional cap 
and trade programs, renewable portfolio standards, and alternative energy incentives states have 
begun to take on the work of emissions reduction that the federal government has not been able 
to undertake. 
 One approach to lowering carbon emissions popular amongst economists is carbon 
pricing. According to basic economic theory, firms take a variety of factors into consideration 
when determining how much of a good to manufacture, chief among those concerns include cost, 
both fixed and variable. Firms are not generally required to pay for the byproducts of their 
manufactured goods, namely the associated pollution that is created during the production 
process. Since they are not required to pay for pollution, they do not consider the costs, social or 
otherwise, of pollution when making business decisions, which often leads to production that 
causes a level of pollution much higher than is socially desirable. This is where carbon pricing 
comes into play: if the firms are required to pay for the carbon dioxide pollution that they emit, it 
is likely that they will not pollute as much. While there are a multitude of ways to put a price on 
carbon (including a basic carbon tax), one method that has become an increasingly popular 
alternative of choice for U.S. states is the method known as cap-and-trade. 
 While cap-and-trade first entered the mainstream of American politics in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s in the context of the EPA’s Acid Rain Program, its origins can be traced back to 
the work of J.H. Dales, an economist at the University of Toronto who in 1968 authored a work 
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entitled Pollution, Property, and Prices that, for the first time, fleshed out the basic tenets of a 
cap-and-trade program designed to lower pollution levels. The goal of cap-and-trade is to set a 
price on emissions of a target pollution (in this case, carbon dioxide) by establishing a market 
where permits that allow the holder to emit a certain amount of the target pollution (often 1 mass 
ton of CO2) can be bought, sold, and traded. These permits can be distributed in a number of 
ways, either through initial giveaways, allocations based on previous pollution levels, or through 
an auction system, with the auction system becoming the most preferred option in many cap and 
trade systems. By simulating a free market as closely as possible, the market clearing price of 
pollution permits at the permit auctions represents the equilibrium price of what the private 
sector considers the worth of CO2 pollution to be, a figure that government regulators are 
unlikely to be able to determine solely on their own. This represents the trade aspect of cap-and-
trade that sets the price on pollution. Tangible emissions reductions come in the “cap” portion of 
cap-and-trade. Each year, a cap of permissible pollution emissions is set. Over time, this cap is 
lowered. The number of permits in the market matches with the cap, so over time there will be 
fewer and fewer permits available, forcing firms to streamline their processes to become more 
efficient and less polluting. According to Dales (1968), as industries grow and the number of 
available permits decrease, “the price of Rights will move upward,” causing a decline in 
pollution levels. 
 Cap-and-trade has become an option of choice for U.S. states seeking to reduce their 
carbon footprints. In fact, one of the premier examples of cap-and-trade in the world has 
emerged in the northeastern United States. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a 
regional cap-and-trade system that covers electric generating power utilities with a capacity of 25 
megawatts or greater that was first established in 2003, and became fully operational in 2009. It 
14 
 
consists of member states Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. At one point, New Jersey was also a 
member state, but Governor Chris Christie withdrew his state from the program effective at the 
end of the year 2011. 
 RGGI operates over the course of three year “control periods.” Companies have until the 
end of the three years to obtain the requisite number of permits for their carbon emissions over 
that same period. The first control period began in January 2009 and ended at the conclusion of 
2011. The second control period lasted from 2012 to 2014, and the third control period is 
currently underway. The cap was set at 91 million tons of aggregate CO2 emissions over the nine 
states per year at the beginning of 2014. This cap is scheduled to decrease by 2.5% each year 
until 2020, when the data available will allow regulators to set a new, more appropriate cap 
(RGGI 2015). The literature on whether or not RGGI has been working is mixed. Much of the 
existing literature must be taken with a grain of salt, as it was either paid for or produced by an 
entity with a vested interest in seeing the program either succeed or fail. Both electricity prices 
and carbon emissions in the region have been falling since RGGI was adopted in 2009. Most 
independent analyses reach the same conclusion: it is likely that RGGI has helped contribute to 
this decline, but the driving factor for these declines was the economic recession and the 
resultant drop in electricity demand (Acadia Center 2015). Cap-and-trade for carbon pollution 
does not just exist in the northeastern United States. California in 2012 became the first state to 
fully implement its own independent cap-and-trade program. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, 
cap-and-trade was a central component of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 that sought to 
combat acid rain pollution in the U.S., a program that most observers agree worked remarkably 
well. While it is unfortunate that economic factors such as the recession may be masking the true 
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effects of cap-and-trade in the northeastern United States, it appears as if cap-and-trade has had 
the baseline level of success needed to stay in places where it has already been adopted, and may 
become an attractive option for other states to adopt in the coming years.  
 Another option that has become increasingly popular across a wider range is a policy 
solution known as the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). The central feature of the RPS is to 
require public utilities within the state to generate a designated portion of their power from 
alternative energy sources. Currently, 37 states and D.C. have adopted some form of an RPS, 
with 8 of those 37 being suggested targets, not necessarily restrictive mandates. Most of the 
states that have not adopted an RPS are states in the Deep South, with a few northwestern states 
like Wyoming and Idaho holding out as well (NCSL 2015). 
 Rabe (2007) discusses the various program designs that an RPS can take. While all states 
define what they consider to be “renewable energy,” all consider basics like solar and wind 
energy to count towards renewable production. One of the biggest divides in program operations 
amongst states is the standards themselves. Most states require some percentage of the total 
electricity generated to come from renewable energy, but other states require a fixed amount of 
energy to be produced from renewables, no matter the total amount of electricity produced (Iowa 
and Texas are two examples of states that do this). Rabe identifies Texas, Pennsylvania, 
Colorado, Nevada, and Massachusetts as states that have experienced a particular success in their 
RPS programs. Rabe also discusses some challenges that have come to face RPS standards 
across states, chief of which has been the growth of competitive special interests representing 
each of the various energy sources, all seeking to get preferential treatment for their specific 
energy source. Another problem identified has been “double counting” – as states begin to 
collaborate and work together to reach their renewable goals, they from time to time will count 
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renewable electricity generation from one state in other states involved in the partnership as well, 
defeating against the entire purpose of the original legislation. 
 The conventional wisdom of most of the previous literature was that RPS adoption was 
more of a symbolic gesture than a real attempt at greenhouse gas reduction, and that RPS 
standards are far too costly given the benefits that they incur (Michaels 2007; Kniefels 2007; 
Fischer and Newell 2008). However, this is not a unanimous view. Yin and Powers (2009) used 
an economic technique known as differences-in-differences regression to demonstrate that “on 
average, RPS policies have had a significant and positive effect on in-state renewable energy 
development.” Ultimately, while the mere passage of an RPS is not an automatic guarantee that 
renewable, cleaner energy will become more abundant, it is an important first step for many 
states to start moving away from carbon-heavy energy sources like oil and coal. 
 As discussed so far, individual states have shown willingness to take action on pollution 
abatement solutions where the federal government is either unable or unwilling to do so. 
However, when discussing a point-source pollution like carbon dioxide, it is often most efficient 
for the most local form of governments to go about solving the problems, as they are the 
governmental bodies most closely integrated into the local communities and economies. In fact, 
due to the concerns such as local health problems and deleterious economic impacts on local 
communities, “local governments can be most effective in controlling pollutants that originate at 
stationary power sources, industrial processes, or solid waste disposal plants located within their 
territorial limits” (Zollinger 1972). Over the past several decades, local governments have indeed 
made progress on pollution issues, despite their relative lack of resources. 
 One area where local governments have made considerable progress is in public 
transportation and municipal government fleets in urban areas. Public transportation in itself, no 
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matter whether powered by traditional petroleum sources or alternative energy, helps to 
considerably reduce pollution emissions due to the fact that it takes automobiles off of the road. 
One way in which cities have been able to accelerate the pollution abatement accrued from 
public transportation is to begin the conversion of their municipal fleets to cleaner-burning 
alternative fuel vehicles, most often vehicles that run off compressed natural gas (CNG). 
Independent studies by researchers at Argonne National Laboratory have shown that greenhouse 
gas emissions from CNG range from 6 to 11 percent lower than the greenhouse gas emissions 
from the equivalent amount of standard gasoline. 
Michaelis (1995) identified municipal fleets as a promising sector into which alternative 
fuel vehicles was likely to expand and outlined several reasons why. Most important of these is 
the fact that fleets such as buses travel predictable routes and return to the same station at the end 
of each day. One of the chief concerns of switching over to alternative fuel vehicles such as 
CNG-powered units, especially for private users, is the lack of necessary infrastructure (i.e. CNG 
fueling stations) that exist across the United States. While certain states such as California, 
Texas, and Oklahoma have a sizable number of fueling stations (AFDC 2016), other states have 
little to no CNG infrastructure whatsoever, so purchasing a CNG-powered car for private use 
makes little sense for private consumers in these states. However, municipal fleets such as city 
bus systems, county vehicles, and other government fleets are perfect targets for CNG expansion, 
as they travel a similar route each day. With minimal infrastructure, cities can support an 
alternative-fuel transportation fleet that is centered on just one or two fueling stations. 
The state of Oklahoma provides a valuable case study on the benefits that can be realized 
from alternative fuel fleets, specifically CNG fleets. As the fourth largest producer of natural gas 
in the United States according to the Energy Information Administration, Oklahoma has a natural 
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advantage over other states when it comes specifically to CNG use. The city of Norman is one 
municipality that has benefited from the adoption of CNG vehicles in their municipal fleets. 
Rosenthal et al. (2012) note three notable benefits that the city of Norman has realized after 
switching over to CNG vehicles. The first is cost savings, with an annual projected saving in fuel 
costs of $60,000. The second is a reduction in noise pollution, a secondary but not unimportant 
benefit in municipalities (CNG vehicles are notably quieter than vehicles that run on standard 
internal combustion engines). The third and primary benefit is, as expected, notable reductions in 
pollution emissions, with lower greenhouse gas emissions and up to 94% decreases in particulate 
matter recorded in the city’s air. Norman is not alone in their adoption of CNG, as county 
administrators have begun taking up CNG vehicles as a cost-saving measure as well (NewsOK 
2015). Both of the states’ major universities (University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State 
University) have adopted CNG vehicles in their fleets. In addition, the two largest metropolitan 
areas in the state, Oklahoma City and Tulsa, have begun adding some CNG buses to their fleets, 
as well as their respective school districts (NewsOK 2015). While transitioning over to natural 
gas, a fossil fuel, is not going to solve the global issues of climate change, it does lead to positive 
impacts in greenhouse gas emissions reductions in local communities, and Oklahoma has 
demonstrated that. While natural-gas vehicles do not make sense in all areas of the country, they 
are a viable option for those areas that have the proven reserves and infrastructure capabilities. 
Another way in which local governments have begun tackling air pollution issues is 
through a mechanism known as a council of governments (COG). COGs are defined as 
“multiservice entities with state and locally-defined boundaries that deliver a variety of federal, 
state, and local programs while continuing to function as a planning organization” (Wolf & 
Bryan 2009). In his seminal work on COG’s, political scientist Nelson Wikstrom identifies the 
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important roles that COGs play in regional planning and cooperation, and finds that COGs that 
operate in a voluntary manner are those that are generally more successful in encouraging 
“interlocal cooperation” (Wikstrom 1977).  COGs have grown in numbers since they were first 
conceived in the 1950s, and the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC) estimates 
that of the 39,000 various municipal governments in the United States, 35,000 of them 
participate in a council of government of some kind (NARC 2016). 
Councils of government allow local, state, and even the federal government to work 
together on a variety of issues that they might not be able to tackle otherwise, and pollution is 
one of these issues. Wolf & Bryan (2009) note that COGs increasingly play “a role in the 
planning and review of programs, particularly with regards to transportation and the 
environment.” In fact, NARC, the association that represents COGs at the federal level in 
Washington D.C., identifies the environment, including alternative and renewable energy 
development, as one of the top three goals that all COGs share, along with economic 
development and public transportation. Notable environmental programs that COGs have 
undertaken in the past include air quality monitoring systems, drinking water testing and 
monitoring, and the administration of the Department of Energy’s Clean Cities program, which 
provides federal investment that is used for helping municipalities become more environmentally 
friend and energy efficient. A large component of this program includes investment in alternative 
fuel vehicles like the CNG vehicles discussed previously. Again, since COGs are voluntary 
associations, it is unlikely that sweeping reforms in pollution control will derive from them. 
However, the cooperation amongst and across all levels of government in combatting 




 Alternative fuel vehicles and COGS are two viable solutions to helping urban regions 
tackle their pollution issues. While it is important to tackle pollution in urban regions due to the 
deleterious effects of concentrated pollution, it is troubling to note that not much headway has 
been made in combatting rural pollution. While there are some signs that rural electric co-
operatives (traditionally a bastion of coal-powered plants due to cost concerns) may be starting to 
invest in solar energy (Roberts 2016), it has been much more difficult to effectively reduce rural 







The Clean Power Plan 
 On August 3, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency released its “Carbon Pollution 
Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units.” 
Colloquially known as the Clean Power Plan, it represented the most comprehensive attempt at 
carbon dioxide that the United States government had ever undertaken. While it became an 
instant political controversy, with some states suing before the final text had even been released, 
the questions of just what exactly the Clean Power Plan is and what it would require of states 
need to be answered. 
 The legal authority for the Clean Power Plan, as claimed by the EPA, is Section 111(d) of 
the Clean Air Act. Section 111(d) gives the EPA Administrator the authority to establish 
‘standards of performance’ for any existing source for any air pollutant, and also require states to 
submit plans for how they intend to meet these newly imposed standards. The EPA, claiming this 
authority, issued the Clean Power Plan as an attempt to combat carbon dioxide pollution from 
existing stationary sources. The EPA ultimately decided to regulate emissions from two 
categories of electric generating units (EGU’s) – fossil-fuel fire electric steam generating units, 
and natural gas-fired combined cycle generating units. The former category most often includes 
coal and oil-fired power plants, the most common types (EPA 2015). Consistent with the 
approach outlined in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, EPA did not choose to proscribe 
certain methods of emissions reductions or required technological upgrades to power plants 
within states (part of a category of regulation known as command-and-control regulation). 
Rather, EPA chose to set benchmark interim and final goals for each state to reach, but are not 
told how they have to get there. The amount of autonomy given to states is near absolute; all they 
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are told is how much they need to reduce their emissions by, and then they have complete control 
over the way that they see best fit to do so. This is important because there is evidence in 
environmental policy literature that well-designed regulation that leaves some flexibility in how 
the standards are met can actually increase efficiency and competitiveness, a phenomenon 
known as the Porter Hypothesis (Ambec et. al. 2011). While the Porter Hypothesis is indeed just 
that, a hypothesis, EPA saw fit to follow its model and let states devise their own solutions to 
carbon emissions, rather than being told what to do by federal regulators who may not know 
what would work best for each state. 
 The specifics of the Clean Power Plan are as follows. EPA regulators, using past data and 
studies on carbon dioxide, determined a best system of emissions reductions (BSER) for each 
state. Based off of this, EPA set emissions reductions targets in three forms for states to reach: 
“A rate-based state goal measured in pounds per megawatt hour (lb/MWh); A mass-based state 
goal measured in total short tons of CO2; and a mass-based state goal with a new source 
complement measured in total short tons of CO2” (EPA 2015). States were originally required to 
submit their intended plans for compliance to EPA by September 2016, with an extension until 
2018 available in some circumstances. It is important to note that the Clean Power Plan applies 
only to the contiguous 48 states; Alaska and Hawaii were not included under the Clean Power 
Plan’s authority. The states must meet the interim goals that were established for them over the 
period from 2022 to 2029, and from 2030 onwards must meet the final goals that were 
established under the plan. The ultimate goal of the Clean Power Plan is to achieve a 32 percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions from their 2005 levels.  
 While EPA did not force any sort of compliance mechanisms on the states, it did make 
recommendations for each state through the BSER system. Called building blocks, EPA set three 
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recommendations for states to reach their emissions targets (EPA 2015). The first building block 
is the improvement of the heat rate of existing coal-powered plants so that the intensity of carbon 
emissions during electricity generation is weakened. The second building block is the shifting of 
electricity production away from high-polluting coal-fired plants and towards lower-polluting 
natural gas-fired plants. The third and final building block is the substitution of electricity 
production generated from zero-emission sources like wind and solar for electricity production 
from coal-fired plants. All three building blocks together follow the general theme of moving the 
nation’s electricity production away from its traditional, heavy reliance on coal-fired plants and 
towards new sources of electricity generation. Interestingly enough, while it did not include it as 
an official building block, EPA has strongly encouraged the states to adopt or join emissions 
trading schemes, like the previously discussed Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 
 On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a stay of the Clean 
Power Plan while its legality was still up for question in the court system. This means that states 
do not have to meet any requirements that would have been imposed on them until the cases 
surrounding the Clean Power Plan have been resolved. All of the separate suits against the EPA 
over the Clean Power Plan have been consolidated into one case at the Federal Court of Appeals 
level. Oral arguments are currently scheduled for the summer of 2016 in the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals, with an appeal to the Supreme Court no matter the outcome very likely. Currently, 
18 states have signed on to help the EPA defend the plan, while 27 states have joined the suit 







Now that the Clean Power Plan has been discussed in detail, the question of why and how 
it has become such a politically-charged regulation can be fleshed out. As mentioned earlier, of 
the fifty American states, 27 have joined the lawsuit against the EPA, 18 have signed on as 
proponents of the Clean Power Plan, and 5 have not yet taken an official action for or against the 
regulation at the state level. As a reminder, Alaska and Hawaii are not required to comply with 
CPP, although Hawaii is one of the 18 states that has signed on in favor (Alaska is one of the five 
“neutral” states). The 18 states that have joined with the EPA are New York, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Massachusetts, and Virginia. The 27 
states suing the EPA are West Virginia, Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Kentucky, Arizona, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and North Dakota (State of West Virginia, et al. v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, et al. (2016)). 
Using this framework, the research question that this paper will attempt to answer is 
“What factors explain a state’s opposition to the Clean Power Plan?” The dependent variable, 
which is official state reaction to the Plan (oppose or not oppose) is a categorical dependent 
variable that lends itself to analysis using logistic regression methods. A more detailed outline of 
the methods employed and a list of independent variables and their theoretical reasons for being 





Discussion of Variables and Hypotheses 
Now that the research question has been defined, the independent variables that will be 
used to measure CPP opposition can be identified. First, the dataset used is one that the author 
compiled from a combination of sources including the U.S. Census Bureau, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, and Energy Information Administration. The 
experimental unit is the 50 states. Washington D.C. was excluded as its extremely small 
geographic size and other factors (such as that it is mostly all residential or business land) make 
it substantially different enough from the population (states) that it was not chosen to be 
included.  
The response or dependent variable is each state’s opposition or lack thereof to the EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan, denoted in the dataset as ‘cppopp.’ Opposition or lack thereof was determined 
in the following way: if the Governor, Attorney General, State Legislature, or state-owned power 
utility had signed on the official condensed lawsuit against CPP that is currently pending in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then they were categorized as in opposition to the plan, and coded 
as a 1. If any of those officials or a combination had signed on to the same lawsuit in support of 
CPP, they were categorized as in support of the plan, and coded as a 0. Five states have not 
currently issued any sort of official governmental response to the plan (Alaska, Idaho, Nevada, 
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee). These five states were coded as a 0 in the dataset as well. This 
decision was made because of the purpose of the analysis. The research question that the analysis 
seeks to answer is what factors explain opposition to the Clean Power Plan. Therefore, support 
and neutral were included in a single category, not opposed. Originally, the plan was to drop 
Alaska and Hawaii from the dataset, as the plan does not apply to those two states. However, 
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since Hawaii has chosen to support the plan even though it does not apply to them, the two states 
were left in the dataset. Nine independent variables were selected to be included in the dataset. A 
short description, as well as theoretical underpinnings for each follows: 
State Population 2015 – The official Census Bureau estimate of each state’s population as 
of July 1st, 2015. The variable was included as a demographic variable for use later. Are small 
states more likely to oppose or support the plan? Does population size make a difference?  
Median Income 2013 – The official Census Bureau three year average (2011-2013) 
estimate of the median household income in each state. Theoretically, poorer states should be 
more likely to oppose the plan, as there is the potential for higher utility costs which would hit 
the poorest consumers hardest. 
Renewable Percentage – The percentage of each state’s energy mix that comes from 
“renewable energy” as defined by the Department of Energy. The latest figures that could be 
obtained were from 2009. States that already produce a large portion of their energy from 
renewable sources should be more likely to support the plan, as it would not require much effort 
on their part to cut back on emissions. Conversely, they might be more likely to oppose the plan 
because they have already cut their emissions through these renewable sources, and may find it 
harder to make further cuts. 
Coal Production 2014 – Coal production by State in the year 2014, as measured in short 
tons. The data comes from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Coal states should be 
the most vehemently opposed to the plan, as one of the explicitly stated goals of the plan is to 
shift U.S. electricity production away from coal-fired plants. 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions 2013 – Carbon dioxide emissions by each state in 2013, 
measured in million metric tons. This data comes from the EIA as well. This variable was 
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included for similar reasons as the renewperc variable. High emissions states may be more likely 
to oppose the plan, but they also may be more likely to support it because it will be easier for 
them to find ways to cut back as compared to states who may have already cut their emissions by 
a substantial amount. 
Natural Gas Production – Natural Gas Marketed Production in the year 2014, measured 
in million cubic feet. This data also comes from EIA. Natural gas producing states could gain 
from the plan, as it wants to move away from coal and towards alternative sources like natural 
gas. However, many natural gas states are also known as oil and coal states who may oppose the 
plan.  
Renewable Portfolio Standards – A categorical variable to measure whether or not the 
state has some form of a renewable portfolio standard in place. From the literature review, an 
RPS is an important step but not a foolproof one towards cutting emissions. A state was coded as 
a 1 if it has adopted such a standard, and a 0 if it has not. 
Cap and Trade – A categorical variable to measure whether or not the state has adopted a 
form of cap and trade. So far, only 11 states have ever tried cap and trade, and 10 currently have 
it in place (the nine RGGI states in the Northeast plus California). Given that cap and trade is 
often pushed as a potential solution by the EPA itself, states that have adopted it may be more 
likely to support the EPA’s plan. A state was coded as a 1 if it is part of a cap and trade program, 
and a 0 if it is not. 
Republican Governor – A categorical variable to measure whether or not the governor of 
the state in question is a Republican or not. Given that the plan was formulated and put into place 
by a Democratic administration, states that have a Republican serving as their chief executive 
officer should in theory be more likely to officially oppose the plan. A state was coded as a 1 if 
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their current governor is a Republican, and a 0 if their governor is not a Republican. There is 
currently one independent Governor in the U.S., Bill Walker of Alaska. Since Mr. Walker’s 
political history is a bit muddled when it comes to party affiliation (he has run as a Republican in 
the past, but his running mate from the last election was a Democrat), it was chosen to code him 
as 0. Therefore, a 1 represents a Republican governor and a 0 represents not a Republican 
governor, not necessarily a Democratic one. If there was more than one current Independent 
governor, a third category for the variable would have been created, however given the fact that 
there is only one it did not seem feasible to create a new category for just one observation. 
Based off of the theoretical reasons for including each variable, the following specific 
hypotheses were formulated in order to test the research question. Each will be answered by the 
analysis to follow. 
1. Republican Governor will be the most significant independent variable for explaining 
Clean Power Plan Opposition. Since the Clean Power Plan is inherently political in 
nature, having a Republican as a state’s chief executive officer should make it 
significantly more likely to oppose the Clean Power Plan. 
2. Additionally, since an explicitly stated goal of the Clean Power Plan is to move U.S. 
electricity production away from coal-fired plants, heavy coal-producing states should be 
much more likely to oppose the plan as well. Therefore, Coal Production in 2014 will be 
another significant independent variable. 
3. Renewable percentage will be another significant independent variable. Since the Clean 
Power Plan wants to make states produce more from renewable sources, states that 





Outline of Statistical Methods Employed 
The data lends itself to analysis using a series of methods known as logistic regression. 
Logistic regression was first developed by statistician David Cox in 1958 (Cox 1958), and was 
developed as on offshoot of ordinary least squares regression (OLS) techniques. Specifically, the 
purpose of logistic regression is to handle cases where the response variable is a categorical 
variable. OLS regression techniques were developed with continuous response variables in mind, 
but oftentimes the dependent variable in question is not continuous. With logistic regression, the 
response variable can be binary or multinomial, as long as it is categorical. One common 
application of logistic regression include examining the effects of a number of variables on the 
presence or absence of a disease. In this case, the response variable is a dichotomous categorical 
variable – a state’s opposition or lack thereof to the EPA’s Clean Power Plan. 
The regression equation calculated from a logistic regression for a model with n 
independent variables and response variable Y can be represented in the following manner:  
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑌) = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛  
Logistic regression is a subcategory of a larger group of linear models known as the generalized 
linear model (GLM). In the statistical package R, generalized linear models can be neatly 
summarized and analyzed using the glm command. 
 The steps of the logistic regression to be carried out will progress in the following way:  
1. First, the data will be imported and cleaned for analysis. The command as.factor() is 
used in R to specify that certain variables are to be treated as factor/categorical variables, 




2. Next, the data must be examined for potential relationships and or problems. This is done 
by creating simple box and whisker plots for each of the continuous independent 
variables against the response. For the categorical independent variables, contingency 
tables against the response will be generated. 
3. The model specification process will be initiated. The initial model will be an additive 
model with all independent variables included. Other models of interest will be examined 
in order to test the hypotheses laid out in the previous section. 
4. Next, the “best possible model” will be identified using the process of stepwise 
regression. Stepwise regression methods determine the “best” possible model by adding 
and subtracting candidate variables from the model and calculating a specified criteria 
(Efroymson 1960). The criteria that will be used to determine the “best” model is 
Akaike’s Information Criterion, or AIC (Akaike 1973). It is extremely useful as a 
comparative measure to choose between models based on their relative quality. Models 
with a lower AIC score are considered to be better fits of the true relationship. 
5. Next, the model will be tested for its overall significance. This can be done by using a 
chi-square test on the difference between the null and residual deviances of the models. 
6. The last step of the analysis will be to convert the coefficients of the estimated model  into 
what is known as an odds ratio for ease of interpretation. The coefficients that R will 
report are given in terms of log odds. Log odds can be converted to an odds ratio by 
exponentiating the log odds coefficient. For example, if we convert a log odds coefficient 
to the odds ratio and it comes out to, say 4.5, that would mean that the presence of that 
independent variable (if categorical) or a 1 unit increase in the variable (if continuous) 





 The logistic regression analysis was run in the statistical package R. The full code used to 
produce all output and results can be found in the Appendices section of the paper. First, the data 
was imported, cleaned, and all categorical variables were identified in the script. 
 The next step of the analysis was to produce the boxplots of each continuous independent 
variable and contingency tables of each categorical independent variable against the response to 
look for trends. All boxplots and tables can be found in the Appendices. After examining the 
plots, it appeared that median income, renewable percentage, carbon dioxide emissions, cap and 
trade, and Republican Governor were variables with a clearly visible difference between states 
that oppose and do not oppose the Clean Power Plan. With median income and renewable 
percentage, states that opposed the Clean Power Plan had a clearly visible lower value on both 
variables than did states that do not oppose the Clean Power Plan. In fact, the median value of 
renewable production percentage for states that oppose the Clean Power Plan is lower than even 
the first quartile value for states that do not oppose the Clean Power Plan. From the carbon 
dioxide emissions boxplot, it appears that CO2 emissions are significantly higher in states that 
oppose the Clean Power Plan. With cap and trade, all 10 states that have adopted some form of it 
do not oppose the Clean Power Plan, while 27 out of the 40 states that have not adopted it oppose 
the Clean Power Plan. Of the 31 states with Republican Governors, 22 of them oppose the Clean 
Power Plan. Of the 19 states with non-Republican Governors, only 5 oppose the Clean Power 
Plan. While none of these variables have been proven statistically or practically significant yet, it 
is important to look for these trends in the data before the actual models are specified. These 
results also lend credence to hypotheses 1 and 3 laid out in the previous section, that Republican 
Governor and Renewable Percentage will be important variables in the model. 
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 The first model that was tested was an additive model that contained all of the candidate 
independent variables. The output for this model, denoted glm1 in the R script, is provided in the 
Appendices section. For this model, the only variable that is statistically significant is the 
renewable percentage variable (log-odds coefficient estimate=-.0376, z=-2.126, p-val=0.0335). 
While it was expected that renewable percentage would be significant, it is surprising that no 
other variables were found to be statistically significant. The AIC for this model was 53.532. The 
next model that was specified was a model containing only renewable percentage. While it is not 
generally advised to drop all non-significant variables and re-run the model, doing so allowed us 
to confirm that renewable percentage is a statistically significant variable, even on its own. The 
output for this model, glm2, can be found in the Appendices section as well. The AIC for this 
model was 61.082, which is higher than the first model we tested. Therefore, while renewable 
percentage is an important variable for our relationship, our model needs more variables to 
properly explain the relationship. 
 Next, stepwise regression was used to determine the “best” possible model in terms of 
AIC, a criteria that measures model quality by instituting a penalty for models that overfit the 
relationship. Running the stepwise regression ran models of all combinations of candidate 
independent variables. The output for the final model is given in the Appendices section, and the 
rest has been redacted due to space concerns. The model that the stepwise regression suggests as 
the best model is one that includes renewable percentage, cap and trade, and Republican 
Governor. This model, henceforth noted as glm3, has an AIC of 44.64, significantly lower than 
the other two models tested so far. 
From this model, we see that the two statistically significant variables are renewable 
percentage (log odds coefficient estimate=-0.03287, z=-2.638, p-val=0.00833) and Republican 
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Governor (log-odds coefficient estimate=1.88158, z=2.108, p-val=0.03501). Both of the p-values 
are below the standard alpha=0.05 level for significance, meaning that we can reject the null 
hypothesis and have evidence to show that they are statistically significant to the relationship. 
Next, we can test for the significance of the overall model using a chi-square test. This 
can be done by subtracting the residual deviance from the null deviance given in the output, 
giving us our chi-square statistic. The degrees of freedom on our test are derived by subtracting 
the residual degrees of freedom from the null degrees of freedom, leaving 3 degrees of freedom. 
The associated p-value from a chi-square value of 32.351 and 3 degrees of freedom, as 
calculated in R, is 0.0000004413. The extremely low p-value allows us to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship, and to conclude that the overall 
model is significant. 
Finally, the coefficients on the renewable percentage and Republican Governor variables 
will be converted to an odds ratio for ease of interpretation. Before the specific results are 
interpreted, it is important to note: An odds ratio of 1 means that a change in the independent 
variable causes no change in the odds of the dependent variable (opposition to Clean Power 
Plan). An odds ratio of less than 1 means that a one unit increase in the variable (if continuous) 
or the presence of the variable (if categorical) makes it less likely that a state will oppose the 
Clean Power Plan. An odds ratio of more than 1 makes it more likely that a state will oppose the 
Clean Power Plan. 
The odds ratio for renewable percentage is 0.9676673, and the odds ratio for Republican 
Governor is 6.563886. These numbers can be interpreted in the following way. An odds ratio of 
0.9676673 means that for a one percent increase in the percentage of a state’s energy production 
that comes from renewables, states become slightly less likely to oppose the Clean Power Plan 
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than they would have been otherwise, based on the fact that the odds ratio is near 1. This 
conclusion matches with the fact that the log-odds coefficient estimate is negative. For 
Republican Governor, the odds ratio is 6.563886. This means that the presence of a Republican 
Governor makes a state approximately 6.564 times more likely to oppose the Clean Power Plan 
than a state that does not have a Republican governor, an odds ratio that is quite large. 
Before the analysis was completed, it was noted that coal production, a variable that was 
hypothesized to be one of the most important for the explanation of the relationship has not 
appeared in any of the models so far. Going back to the original additive model, coal 
production’s coefficient was not found to be statistically significant (z=.275, p-val=.7834). An 
additional model was specified to test for the significance of coal production on its own, without 
other variables that may be masking its effect. However, this model again showed no statistical 







 Now that the data has been analyzed and models tested for their significance, conclusions 
on the research question and the hypotheses can be drawn. As a reminder, the research question 
around which the entire analysis was framed is “What factors explain a state’s opposition to the 
Clean Power Plan?”  
 The first hypothesis posited that Republican Governor would be the most important 
variable in explaining a state’s opposition to the Clean Power Plan. This hypothesis was 
supported by the analysis. Republican governor was statistically significant in both the model on 
its own and in the “best” model with the lowest AIC. It appears that political concerns do play a 
major role here. Despite all other characteristics of a state provided for in this analysis, just 
simply having a Republican Governor makes a state about 6.5 times as likely to oppose the 
Clean Power Plan. This is not necessarily a negative finding. It may be that Republican 
Governors are truly representing the will of their constituents by taking this position on the Clean 
Power Plan. This raises further questions for research and analysis in the future, such as how the 
interaction between Republican Governors and other factors like public opinion for and against 
the Clean Power Plan correlate with one another. 
 The second hypothesis posited that coal production would be another significant variable 
for explaining state opposition to the Clean Power Plan. This hypothesis was not supported at all 
by the analysis. Coal production was not found to be a statistically significant variable in any of 
the models that were specified. This finding was of interest, because the theoretical reasons 
behind why the hypothesis was made still stand true. Coal miners and coal executives are 
steadfast opponents to the plan, so why would this trend not follow through on the state level? 
The best way to answer this question was just to return to the original data. The likely reason for 
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the lack of significance on the coal production variable was the fact that there are quite a few 
states that produce no coal whatsoever, yet still oppose the Clean Power Plan for a variety of 
other reasons (Michigan, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina are just a few). In addition, two of 
the largest coal producing states, Illinois and Alaska, either support or have not taken a position 
on the Clean Power Plan. So, while it is true that many of the heaviest coal producing states 
(Kentucky, West Virginia, Montana, etc.) do oppose the Clean Power Plan, the presence of no-
coal states opposing the plan and the presence of Illinois and Alaska’s lack of opposition were 
likely enough to mask any sort of statistical significant relationship from appearing in the 
models. Therefore, while it was not statistically significant within the context of the logistic 
regression model run in this analysis, it is potentially still a practically significant variable in 
explaining why some, but not all states, oppose the Clean Power Plan. 
 The lack of significance on the coal production variable illustrates some of the flaws 
inherent with statistical analysis and an overreliance on data alone. If one were just to rely on the 
data and the resulting analysis alone, they would not find coal a significant variable for 
explaining Clean Power Plan opposition. In most cases, it is best to not rely solely on 
quantitative or qualitative analysis. A mixture of the two can generally allow one to make solid 
conclusions while also further exploring trends that may not be as evident in the data. 
 Another set of issues that arise when studying states is that there only fifty of them, 
meaning that the power of any statistical tests that are run is lower due to the fact that is difficul t 
to make strong conclusions off of such a small sample size. If the sample size, n, was 500, or 
5,000, it would be more appropriate to make stronger conclusions about the data, and trends that 
may be masked by smaller n samples (like coal production’s relationship to Clean Power Plan 
opposition) would be much more likely to be detected with a larger sample size. Promising 
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trends in quantitative research that seek to address this problem include sampling from the 
existing data and simulating new data with a larger n, so that stronger conclusions can be formed. 
 The final hypothesis posited that renewable percentage would be another important 
variable in explaining state opposition to the Clean Power Plan. This hypothesis was supported 
by the analysis. Renewable percentage was a statistically significant variable in all models 
specified, and its odd ratio of less than 1 confirms the hypothesis that states with higher levels of 
renewable energy production would be less likely to oppose the Clean Power Plan. Since the 
Clean Power Plan is an attempt to move states over to renewable production, states that already 
have high levels of renewable energy production are indeed less likely to oppose the plan as it 
would not be a significant burden to them.  
 Ultimately, the two most significant variables in explaining opposition were renewable 
percentage and Republican Governor. While other variables such as coal production and natural 
gas production did not have as much of a significant relationship as expected, there is potentially 
still the chance that the variables remain practically important for those assessing support and 
opposition for the Clean Power Plan. For those who wish to move past the protracted legal and 
political stalemate surrounding the Clean Power Plan, it is important to note that a state’s 
political leanings and its renewable energy production are two of the dominant driving factors in 
determining a state’s stance towards the plan. Ultimately, if the regulation is to ever move 
forward in a successful manner, it will take a good-faith, concerted effort by all parties involved 
to reach a common goal of emissions reductions. Bridging the vast differences between states on 
this issue will be impossible unless there is first an attempt to step into the role of the opposition, 
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Appendix B – Tables of Categorical Independent Variables against Response 
             rps 
cppopp        No Yes 
  Not Opposed  3  20 
  Opposed     10  17 
 
             capandtrade 
cppopp        No Yes 
  Not Opposed 13  10 
  Opposed     27   0 
 
            repubgov 
cppopp        Not a Republican Republican 
  Not Opposed               14          9 
  Opposed                    5         22  
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Appendix C – Summary Output from Selected Models 
> summary(glm1) 
Call: 
glm(formula = cppopp ~ statepop2015 + medincome + renewperc +  
    coalprod2014 + X2013co2 + natgasprod2014 + rps + capandtrade +  
    repubgov, family = binomial, data = data) 
 
Coefficients: 
                 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)   
(Intercept)     3.785e+00  3.813e+00   0.993   0.3208   
statepop2015   -2.013e-07  2.105e-07  -0.956   0.3389   
medincome      -6.814e-05  6.800e-05  -1.002   0.3163   
renewperc      -3.076e-02  1.447e-02  -2.126   0.0335 * 
coalprod2014    2.482e-06  9.030e-06   0.275   0.7834   
X2013co2        1.805e-02  1.685e-02   1.071   0.2840   
natgasprod2014 -7.627e-07  6.802e-07  -1.121   0.2622   
rps1            2.038e-01  1.001e+00   0.204   0.8387   
capandtrade1   -1.825e+01  3.132e+03  -0.006   0.9953   
repubgov1       1.514e+00  1.010e+00   1.499   0.1339   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 68.994  on 49  degrees of freedom 





glm(formula = cppopp ~ renewperc, family = binomial, data = data) 
 
Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)  1.23061    0.45545   2.702  0.00689 ** 
renewperc   -0.03195    0.01077  -2.965  0.00302 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 68.994  on 49  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 57.082  on 48  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 61.082 
 





(Output redacted as all possible models were tested, final model is shown) 
 
Step:  AIC=44.64 




                 Df Deviance    AIC 
<none>                36.643 44.643 
+ medincome       1   35.188 45.188 
+ natgasprod2014  1   36.417 46.417 
+ statepop2015    1   36.482 46.482 
+ rps             1   36.574 46.574 
+ coalprod2014    1   36.641 46.641 
+ X2013co2        1   36.642 46.642 
- repubgov        1   41.524 47.524 
- renewperc       1   45.397 51.397 





glm(formula = cppopp ~ capandtrade + renewperc + repubgov, family = binomial,  
    data = data) 
 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)     0.61758    0.72035   0.857  0.39126    
capandtrade1  -19.63592 2943.75958  -0.007  0.99468    
renewperc      -0.03287    0.01246  -2.638  0.00833 ** 
repubgov1       1.88158    0.89250   2.108  0.03501 *  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 68.994  on 49  degrees of freedom 





glm(formula = cppopp ~ coalprod2014, family = binomial, data = data) 
 
Coefficients: 
               Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept)  -1.207e-01  3.277e-01  -0.368    0.713 
coalprod2014  2.203e-05  1.566e-05   1.406    0.160 
 
(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1) 
 
    Null deviance: 68.994  on 49  degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance: 65.276  on 48  degrees of freedom 
AIC: 69.276  
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data <- read.csv("thesisdata1.csv", header=TRUE) 
data$cppopp <- as.factor(data$cppopp) 
data$rps <- as.factor(data$rps) 
data$capandtrade <- as.factor(data$capandtrade) 
data$repubgov <- as.factor(data$repubgov) 
summary(data) 
attach(data) 
levels(cppopp) <- c("Not Opposed", "Opposed") 
levels(rps) <- c("No", "Yes") 
levels(capandtrade) <- c("No", "Yes") 
levels(repubgov) <- c("Not a Republican", "Republican") 
 
#Examining Data Part 1 - Boxplots of Continuous Independent Variables vs. 
Response Variable 
plot(statepop2015~cppopp, main="Boxplot of cppopp vs. statepop2015", 
xlab="CPP Opposition", ylab="Census Bureau 2015 Estimate of State 
Population") 
plot(medincome~cppopp, main="Boxplot of cppopp vs. medincome", xlab="CPP 
Opposition", ylab="Census Bureau Estimate of Median Household Income 2011-
2013") 
plot(renewperc~cppopp, main="Boxplot of cppopp vs. renewperc", xlab="CPP 
Opposition", ylab="Percent of State's Energy Production from Renewable 
Energy") 
plot(coalprod2014~cppopp, main="Boxplot of cppopp vs. coalprod2014", 
xlab="CPP Opposition", ylab="Coal Production by State in short tons") 
plot(X2013co2~cppopp, main="Boxplot of cppopp vs. 2013co2", xlab="CPP 
Opposition", ylab="Carbon Dioxide Emissions by State in 2013 (million metric 
tons)") 
plot(natgasprod2014~cppopp, main="Boxplot of cppopp vs. natgasprod2014", 
xlab="CPP Opposition", ylab="Natural Gas Production by State in 2014 (million 
cubic feet)") 
 
#Examining Data Part 2 - Contingency Tables of Categorical Independent 





#Initial Model Specifications 
glm1 <- 
glm(cppopp~statepop2015+medincome+renewperc+coalprod2014+X2013co2+natgasprod2
014+rps+capandtrade+repubgov, family=binomial, data=data) 
summary(glm1) 






































#One Final Model 
glm4 <- glm(cppopp~coalprod2014, family=binomial, data=data) 
summary(glm4) 
